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ABSTRACT
This paper compares the design features and implementation of the
social health insurance (SHI) for the poor programs of the Philip-
pines and Vietnam. The National Health Insurance Program-Spon-
sored Program of the Philippines and the Health Care Fund for the
Poor Program of Vietnam both intend to improve the health status
and, ultimately, the economic condition of the poor population. Fol-
lowing the framework of Carrin and James (2004), these programs are
evaluated in terms of revenue collection, risk pooling, and purchas-
ing for the period 1996–2005. Both programs are tax financed. Cover-
age is high but not yet universal because of limited administrative
and financial capabilities of local government units (LGUs). Risk-
pooling is nationwide in the Philippines and the poor enrollees get
cross-subsidies from other insurance members. Meanwhile, risk pool-
ing is provincewide in Vietnam and the poor do not get any subsidy
from other health insurance programs. In addition to financing, the
LGUs in the two countries also provide services to the poor. As the
experiences of these countries show, the traditional approaches to
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provider payments and quality control have only weak incentive
effects on performance under a decentralized health setting. It is
argued that more attention should be given to such institutional
context in the design of SHI programs.
INTRODUCTION
This paper compares the design features and implementation of the social health
insurance (SHI) for the poor programs of the Philippines and Vietnam. These
programs are both designed to improve the health status and, ultimately, the
economic condition of the poor population. While the social objectives of these
programs are laudable, meeting them is difficult from an insurance point of view.
In particular, the financial sustainability of the program is compromised by ad-
verse selection. As target beneficiaries, the poor have low ability to pay their
premium contributions yet they also have greater health needs than others be-
cause of their lower health status. If the poor, however, are required to pay their
insurance premiums, then only a few of them will have insurance coverage. In
comparison, the moral hazard problem is less serious because the poor cannot
overuse their insurance benefits due to lack of funds for transportation, drugs,
and other out-of-pocket expenses. Due to their budget constraints, they may not
also seek health care even when they need it. If so, then the SHI program like-
wise fails on its objective.
It is therefore interesting to know how these insurance issues are addressed
under the National Health Insurance Program-Sponsored Program (NHIP-SP) of
the Philippines and the Health Care Fund for the Poor (HCFP) Program of Vietnam.
These SHI programs were formally started in 1995 and 2002, respectively, although
similar programs preceded them. The comparison of the two programs follows the
framework of Carrin and James (2004) who propose to evaluate SHI programs in
two levels.
The first level focuses on the health financing elements, namely, revenue
collection, risk pooling, and purchasing. These elements jointly determine the
adequacy and sustainability of the funds, the extent by which members gain
financial accessibility to health services, and the overall optimality of resource
use.
The second level links the SHI’s impact to health policy goals such as im-
proved overall health status, greater equity in health access, and increased respon-
siveness of the health system to changing and varied needs of the population.
This paper evaluates the health financing elements of these two SHI for
the poor programs for the period 1996–2005 for which data are available. By
presenting “counterfactual experiences” with alternative design features, the
comparative analysis offered in this paper complements the more in-depth analy-CAPUNO 213
sis of the SHI programs previously conducted in the Philippines (e.g., Solon et
al. 2003; Schneider and Racelis 2004; Jowett and Hsiao 2005; Obermann et al.
2006) and Vietnam (e.g., Knowles et al. 2003; Tran 2005; Wagstaff 2007). How-
ever, it should be noted that these programs were developed and implemented in
dissimilar institutional contexts.
In particular, the role of the private sector in health sector is much wider in
the Philippines than in Vietnam. The participation of the private sector in the SHI
for the poor programs poses competition to the public sector, whose role, organi-
zation, and management changed with the adoption of the decentralized approach
in the Philippines and Vietnam. Interestingly, the health decentralization also brings
into focus the limitations of traditional design of SHI programs. Under decentrali-
zation, the local government units (LGUs) became the service provider. With the
introduction of the SHI for the poor programs, they also became the financier of
insurance in both countries. In Vietnam, the LGUs also assumed the functions of
third-party payor. The multiple roles assigned to LGUs give them enormous pow-
ers and also conflicting incentives. As suggested by the experience of these coun-
tries, the incentives and bargaining power of LGUs relative to the SHI agency may
be different from what has been usually assumed.
The rest of the paper proceeds with a discussion in the second section of
the poverty situation in the Philippines and Vietnam , followed by a description of
the key design features of the SHI programs in the third section. A comparison of
the revenue generation, risk pooling, and purchasing aspects of the two programs
is taken up in the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections, respectively. Some concluding
remarks end the paper.
THE POOR IN CONTEXT
The Philippines and Vietnam are both developing countries and have similar pov-
erty situation. The poor households in these countries remain a big portion of the
total, although Vietnam’s rate of poverty reduction is relatively faster because of
its impressive economic performance since the Doi Moi (market-oriented) reforms
started in 1986. The poor in the two countries are also mostly concentrated in
certain regions and have relatively poor health status.
The two countries have about the same population, which for over 15years
since 1990, has grown to 83 million, from 61.1 million in the Philippines and 66.2
million in Vietnam (Table 1).  About half (50.4%) of the Filipinos and a fifth (21.6%)
of the Vietnamese live in urban areas in 2004. The Philippines is slightly richer but
grows slower than Vietnam. From 1998 to 2005, its income per capita grew by 49.71
percent, from US$3,540 to US$5,300. In contrast, Vietnam’s income per capita ex-
panded by 78.11 percent, from US$1,690 to US$3,010, as a result of the country’s
shift from a planned economy to a market-oriented economy.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 214
Table 1. Selected socioeconomic indicators
























Prevalence of child malnutrition (% of children under age 5)
1992–1997** 30 45
2000–2004** 28 28














Sources of data: World Development Report 1999/2000; World Development Report 2006;
World Development Indicators 2006.
* From Asian Development Bank Key Indicators 2004.
**Data are for the most recent year available within the period.CAPUNO 215
Other development indicators also reflect such trend of increasing eco-
nomic payoffs. Since 1980, for example, the prevalence of child malnutrition, infant
mortality, under-five mortality, and life expectancy at birth have steadily improved
in both countries.  Even the number of poor people has declined through the years
although they have benefited less than the others from the economic progress.
About 47.5 percent of Filipinos in 2000 and 58.5 percent of Vietnamese in 2002 were
living on less than US$2 a day. This can be explained partly by the persistently
skewed distribution of income in these countries. In 2002, the Gini indices were
46.1 for the Philippines in 2000 and 37.0 for Vietnam, both of which have not
improved much since 1997.
According to the 2005 World Health Report, the Philippines’ total health
expenditures on health was about 3.2 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP)
in 2003, slightly lower than the 3.5 percent share registered in 1999.  In 1999,
Vietnam also had about the same share of total health expenditures in GDP (3.4%).
This share  shot up to 5.4 percent in 2003. In both countries, the private expendi-
tures on health—comprising mostly out-of-pocket expenditures—accounted for
the bulk of the total expenditures on health each year from 1999 to 2003. In 2003, for
example, the percentage share of private expenditures in the total expenditures on
health was 56.3 in the Philippines; it was 72.2 in Vietnam. The percentage share of
private out-of-pocket expenditures in the total private expenditures on health in
2003 was 78.2 in the Philippines and 72.2 in Vietnam.
The poor in the two countries are also unevenly concentrated across re-
gions. In the Philippines, about a third of all poor families in 1997, 2000, and 2003
live in just three regions: Southern Tagalog, Bicol, and Western Visayas (Table 2).
Poverty rate, however, is consistently highest in the Autonomous Region of Mus-
lim Mindanao (ARMM), Central Mindanao, CARAGA, and Bicol region. In con-
trast, the National Capital Region has both the lowest poverty rate and the fewest
number of poor households.
Similarly, based on the 2002 poverty thresholds set by the General Statis-
tics Office of Vietnam, three in five poor Vietnamese live in just three regions:
Northern Uplands1, Mekong River Delta, and North Central Coast (Table 3).
Roughly the same proportion is found in 2003 based on a different poverty
threshold set by the Ministry of Labor, Invalid and Social Affairs (MOLISA).
The poverty rate is also very high in the Central Highland region although it is
consistently lowest in South East and Red River Delta, the two principal politi-
cal-administrative regions.
Vietnam also has a large and mostly poor ethnic population. According to
the Vietnam Development Report 2004 (World Bank 2004b), the share of ethnic
1 The Northern Uplands comprise the North East and North West regions.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 216
Table 2. Regional poverty incidence in the Philippines: 1997, 2000, and 2003
1997 2000 2003
Region No. of Incidence No. of poor Incidence No. of poor Incidence
poor of poor families of poor families of poor
families families families families
Philippines 3,982,766 28.1 4,146,663 27.5 4,022,629 24.7
NCR 95,446 4.8 127,655 5.7 110,864 5.0
CAR 93,080 35.9 84,717 30.7 72,084 24.8
Ilocos Region 244,247 31.4 237,910 29.4 213,846 24.4
Cagayan Valley 159,294 27.1 143,421 25.2 113,298 19.3
Central Luzon 199,482 13.9 268,558 17.3 242,820 13.7
Southern Tagalog 442,068 22.8
Southern Tagalog A 272,665 15.2 316,911 16.3
Southern Tagalog B 162,440 36.3 199,485 22.6
Bicol 454,023 46.9 407,176 45.3 383,625 40.5
Western Visayas 465,231 37.2 444,172 36.6 397,073 31.3
Central Visayas 312,259 29.8 348,154 31.5 286,478 23.7
Eastern Visayas 299,733 39.9 276,878 37.5 266,423 35.5
Western  Mindanao 177,333 31.9 209,842 38.5 258,497 44.1
Northern Mindanao 199,618 37.8 261,501 37.9 278,538 37.9
Southern Mindanao 276,757 31.1 202,121 27.7 231,068 28.1
Central  Mindanao 188,551 45.3 264,301 40.7 227,093 32.0
CARAGA 180,846 44.7 179,226 43.7 195,622 47.3
ARMM 194,800 50.0 255,879 53.7 228,970 45.7
Source: Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2004, 2005, National Statistical Coordination Board.
Table 3. Regional poverty incidence in Vietnam: 2002 and 2003
2002 (GSO Poverty Rate) 2003 (MOLISA Poverty Rate)
Region Magnitude Incidence Poor Magnitude   Incidence Poor
of Poor of Poor Population of Poor of Poor Population
Population Population (% total) Population Population (% total)
Vietnam 22,521,685 25.2 100.00 14,367,167 17.4 100.00
Northern Uplands 5,666,104 41.7 25.16 4,743,730 33.4 33.01
Red River Delta 3,074,211 21.3 13.65 995,662 6.4 6.93
North Central Coast 4,512,836 43.8 20.03 2,232,081 21.6 15.54
South Central Coast 1,695,738 25.0 7.53 865,530 12.5 6.02
Central Highlands 2,271,426 51.5 10.08 1,905,786 38.6 13.27
South East 1,279,253 10.2 5.68 1,039,888 8.1 7.23
Mekong River Delta 4,022,117 14.7 17.86 2,584,490 14.6 17.99
Sources: World Bank, Mediconsult (2003).CAPUNO 217
minorities in the poor population has increased from 20 percent in 1993 to 30
percent in 2002. The poorest ethnic minorities are found in the Central Highlands
and the Northern Uplands regions. In 2002, even controlling for all other character-
istics, a member of an ethnic minority household was likely to have expenditure
levels lower by 14 percent than those coming from a Kinh (dominant ethnic group)
or a Chinese household. In the Philippines, the high poverty rates in the ARMM
also have an ethnic dimension but the continuing armed conflict in the region is
considered the bigger reason why the region lags behind the others.
The relative depravity of the poor population in both countries is also re-
flected in their health status and access to health care. In the Philippines, a child
born in 1997 to a poor family was more than twice as likely to die within a year or
five years after birth than a child born to a rich family (Table 4). Moreover, a poor
child is more susceptible to common illnesses such as fever, diarrhea, or acute
respiratory infection. The poor children in Vietnam faced the same bleak chances
of survival in 1998. Child mortality and the incidence of illness even worsened for
poor families in 2000.
More children of poor families die or get sick because of less access to
health care. In both countries, less than 60 percent of the children of poor families
in 1997 and 1998 received a complete basic immunization package (i.e., shots for
BCG, measles, DPT). In Vietnam, at least 13 percent of the children of poor families
did not get any of the basic immunization shots in 1988 and 2000. In the onset of
fever, diarrhea, or acute respiratory infection, less than 30 percent of the poor
children in the Philippines in 1997 were brought to either public or private health
facilities for treatment. In Vietnam, relatively higher proportions of poor children
with similar health conditions were brought to public facilities in 1998 and 2000.
The effective insurance coverage of the poor and their access to health care
services can be  better understood by looking at the overall structure of the two
countries’ health sector. The Philippines has a larger private health sector com-
pared to Vietnam. In 2005, of the total 1,838 hospitals in the Philippines, about
61.81 percent were privately owned. They also accounted for about half of the
total number of hospital beds (87,739) in the same year.  In contrast, there were
only 17 private general and specialist hospitals in Vietnam in 2001, according to
some estimates of Vietnam’s Ministry of Health. The private sector catered more to
outpatient curative care services, with about 33,800 general and specialist clinics,
and maternity homes in the country.
In both countries, the public health sector is also highly decentralized. In
1993, following the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991, the Philip-
pine Department of Health devolved 46,080 health personnel out of 78,000, 595
government hospitals out of 639, and all 12,580 rural health units and otherPHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 218
Table 4. Relative child health status and access to care of the poorest population groups
in the Philippines and Vietnam
Philippines Vietnam
(1997) 1998 2000
Lowest Ratio of Lowest Ratio of Lowest Ratio of
                  Indicators wealth lowest to wealth lowest to wealth lowest to
quintile highest quintile highest quintile highest
asset asset asset
quintile quintile quintile
Child illness and mortality
 Infant mortality rate 42.8 2.53 48.8 2.33 39.3 2.85
 Under-five mortality rate 63.3 2.75 79.8 2.73 52.9 3.35
 Prevalence of fever (%) 20.7 1.37 26.4 1.36 30.9 1.68
 Prevalence of diarrhea (%) 10.1 1.63 8.8 1.80 18.2 4.79
 Prevalence of acute respiratory
   infection (%) 14 1.39 15.3 1.68 23.7 1.69
Childhood immunization (%)
 Full basic coverage (BCG, measles,
  DPT) 42.2 0.70 59.8 0.69 44.3 0.48
 No basic coverage 7.3 18.25 16.4 16.40 13.9 na
Treatment of childhood illness in a public facility (%)
 Fever 19.6 0.73 25.6 4.74 30.6 1.59
 Diarrhea (24.0)      na 35.8 10.53 38.1 na
 Acute respiratory infection 29.7 0.56 37.4 3.14 50.5 2.19
Treatment of childhood illness in a private facility (%)
 Fever 16.1 0.76 6.5 0.18 11.5 0.27
 Diarrhea (17.0)   na 6.9 0.25 10.4  na
 Acute respiratory infection 24.8 0.87 9.4 0.15 13.1 0.24
Notes: “na” means not available. Figures in parentheses indicate the absence of adequate observations
to produce acceptably reliable values.
Source: World Bank (2005).
primary health care facilities to LGUs. Altogether, the devolved health person-
nel, services, and facilities accounted for about 41.21 percent of the total budget
of the Department of Health in 1992. Gaining an important role in the health
sector, the LGUs, by 2004, have contributed 14.4 percent of the funds for all
health expenditures in the country, a significant input considering that the na-
tional government’s share was 15.9 percent.
In Vietnam, the decentralization of health services began with the enactment
of the State Budget Law of 1986. This was further strengthened in 2001 with theCAPUNO 219
issuance of the Prime Minister’s Decision 13/2001 promulgating the government’s
Administration Reform Program, and, a year later, of the State Budget Law of 2002.
Based on the Vietnam National Health Accounts, the provincial governments con-
sistently outspent the central government in health throughout the period 1991–
2000. In 2000, for example, health expenditures of the provincial governments and
the national government totaled VND 3,631,754 and VND 1,451,725, respectively,
or 41.86 and 17.44 percent of the total health expenditures (from all sources) in the
same year (Knowles et al. 2003).  Like in the Philippines, local governments have
control over secondary, primary, and other lower level health facilities.
In a decentralized setting, with better information available to local offi-
cials about the needs of their constituents, especially the poor, it is expected that
the level and quality of devolved health services, including health insurance
coverage, would have improved. This will depend, however, on the accountabil-
ity of the local officials to their constituents and service clients. All local political
officials in the Philippines are elected for a fixed term of office. Those in Vietnam
are likewise elected, but most candidates are first vetted by the Communist Party
of Vietnam , whose members occupy most local offices. With the differences in
political structures, the local residents or service clients in the Philippines in
principle have more direct influence on their political leaders, and therefore on
the availability and quality of health services than  their counterparts in Vietnam.
It is a common observation, however, that the service performances of Filipino
politicians are only weakly correlated with their election performances, which
suggests that the poor, despite their huge number, may only have a weak influ-
ence on local services.
PRO-POOR SOCIAL HEALTH INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The SHI for the poor programs of the Philippines and Vietnam were initiated in 1995
and 2002, respectively, in an attempt to consolidate and expand past initiatives. In
the Philippines, the National Health Insurance Act was passed in 1995 (i.e., Repub-
lic Act 7875) to establish a nationwide program that integrates the Medicare pro-
gram, then administered by the Government Service Insurance System for the
state employees and by the Social Security System for the private sector employ-
ees, and extends coverage to the poor and other sectors. In Vietnam, the Prime
Minister’s Decision 139/2002/QD-TTg issued in 2002 created the Health Care Funds
for the Poor (HCFP). The HCFP builds on the heath sector’s experience with previ-
ous health care-for-the-poor schemes.2
2 For a review of the social health insurance programs in the Philippines before 1995, see Gamboa et al.
(1993). For  a review of the health care-for-the-poor schemes in Vietnam prior to the HCFP, see Knowles
et al. (2002). On the evolution of the SHI programs in the two countries, see Obermann et al. (2006) and
Akal (2004).PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 220
The general objective of the NHIA is to provide all Filipino citizens, espe-
cially the poor, with health insurance to gain access to health services. The
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (PhilHealth) was established to admin-
ister the National Health Insurance Program, which includes among its members
all enrolled indigents under its so-called Sponsored Programs.
Meanwhile, the HCFP program of Vietnam, which is administered by the
Fund Management Board (FMB) in each province, has the same objective of
extending insurance coverage to the poor population as well as to residents of
the socioeconomically disadvantaged communes (as defined in Prime Minister’s
Decision 135/1998/QD-TTg) and members of ethnic minorities (as defined in
Prime Minister’s Decisions 168/2001/QD-TTg and 186/2001/QD-TTg). The key
members of the FMB are the Vice Chairman of the Provincial People’s Committee
and officials from the province’s departments of health, finance, social welfare,
and labor, as well as representatives from the local office of the Vietnam Social
Security (VSS).
The key design features of the two programs are summarized in Table 5.
Unless indicated, these are the original features contained in the NHIA of 1995
and the Prime Minister’s Decision 139/2002/QD-TTg. The NHIP of 1995 was
amended in 2002 with the passage of Republic Act 9241. The key amendments
are the specification of the list of personal health services excluded from insur-
ance benefits, the adjustments in the share of LGUs in the payment of indigent
premium contributions, and in the provider accreditation rules.
Meanwhile, some of the HCFP features were modified starting mid-2005
following the issuance of Prime Minister’s Decision 170/2005/QD-TTg and
Government’s Decree 63/2005/ND-CP. Specifically, Decision 170/2005/QD-TTg
sets the new and higher poverty lines for 2006–2010, which effectively increased
the number of target beneficiaries of the HCFP.  Decree 63/2005/ND-CP enunci-
ated regulatory reforms in medical insurance, including the re-classification of
HCFP beneficiaries as members of the compulsory health insurance scheme with
same entitlements as the other paying members of this scheme. The financial
management and control of the HCFP was also transferred from the provincial
FMB to the VSS. The VSS is tasked to administer and expand the existing com-
pulsory and voluntary health insurance schemes, with the goal of achieving
universal coverage. 3
3 The draft proposed revisions in Decision 139 (as of June 2006) also seeks to allow the accreditation of
qualified private providers and to require all provinces to adopt the health insurance card scheme. If
approved, this new law will increase the current state budget support of VND52,500 to VND60,000 per
person per year. Partial insurance subsidy will also be extended to those whose income is between one

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While these recent changes are important improvements in the HCFP,
their implementation is not yet reflected in the data presented in this paper.
Nonetheless, these changes are better understood in the light of the three-
years’ worth of experience with the original HCFP design, as will be discussed
in the succeeding section.
RESOURCE GENERATION
According to Carrin and James (2004), one of the performance targets of a well-
performing health financing system is “to generate sufficient and sustainable
resources for health” through  careful design of population coverage and method
of finance. The extent of population coverage will determine how much resources
can be generated from the members, given their socioeconomic profile, and how
much of these resources will be used to support their health expenditures, given
their demographic and health characteristics. To ensure financial sustainability,
therefore, the SHI program should have full flexibility in the design of enrollment
strategies and setting of premium contribution to exploit the variations in health
status and service utilization across socioeconomic groups. However, such flex-
ibility is found neither in the NHIP-SP of the Philippines nor in the HCFP pro-
gram of Vietnam. In both programs, the target coverage and methods of premium
payments are set by law, constrained by fiscal resources and administrative
procedures, and, therefore, could have less-than-secure actuarial basis.  While
the target coverage is nearly achieved, the financing of these SHI for the poor
programs is likewise precarious.
Identification and financing
The target beneficiaries in the two countries are identified and screened using
formal means. In the Philippines, the poor are identified based on a means test,
roughly the same approach used in Vietnam. Once identified, the eligible ben-
eficiaries are enrolled by their LGUs into the SHI program.  Loopholes in the
means test instrument (which checks for visible assets) and snags in the identi-
fication and verification procedures lead to errors of inclusion and exclusion
or spotty coverage.  Consequently, financing is also inequitable.
The means test in the Philippines is administered by the local Social Welfare
Development Officer. The target beneficiaries are defined as the lowest 25 percent
of the local population. These beneficiaries are individually identified through the
use of the Community Based Information System-Minimum Basic Needs indica-
tors and a uniform poverty thresholds, and then further verified through the family
data survey of PhilHealth. The list of qualified beneficiaries—comprising all family
members and legal dependents excluding children 21 years old and above—is
submitted to the LGU for verification and decision.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 224
Under the law, an LGU is required to enroll the eligible poor household in
the NHIP-SP and subsidize partially or fully their premium contribution, which is
pegged at PhP1,200 per year.  The LGU shares with the national government the
premium subsidy, the amount of which is based on the LGU’s income classifica-
tion. In the first year of enrollment, LGUs from the first to third income classes
contribute 50 percent of the total premium contributions. Those in the lower
fourth to sixth income classes contribute 90 percent during the first and second
years of enrollment, and their share is raised progressively thereafter until it
reaches 50 percent by the 10th year.4
In Vietnam, the same approach is used in identifying the target beneficiaries:
the low-income residents, the members of ethnic minorities, and the people living
in mountainous and economically depressed areas. The local labor official is tasked
to identify the target beneficiaries through a household economic survey and the
nationally set income poverty thresholds. The initial list of qualified beneficiaries5
is presented in a commune meeting for verification. A revised list is later drawn up
and sent to the provincial FMB for decision.
The FMB decides on whether or not to extend the insurance cover to the
listed beneficiaries and to provide them the statutory premium subsidy of up to
VND70,000 per person per year using state budget and other funds from private
or international donors. The state budget consists of VND52,500 per beneficiary
per year  that the national government provides and whatever additional amount
the provincial government can voluntarily raise from its own sources for the
HCFP. Since most provinces are unable or unwilling to raise funds, the national
government transfer is effectively the only source of finance for the HCFP. Of
the annual state budget per beneficiary, a minimum of VND50,000 is used to
subsidize premium contributions; the remaining amount (VND2,500) is allotted
for administrative expenses.
Target vs. actual enrollment
As LGUs in Vietnam only need to enlist their identified beneficiaries using the
annual state budget allocation whereas those in the Philippines are mandated to
raise their counterpart premium contributions as well, the enrolment of the poor into
the SHI program should be easier under the HCFP than under the NHIP-SP. The
expected effects of these design features are very well reflected in the actual enroll-
4 An LGU can refer to a province, a municipality, a city, or a barangay where the member resides. In
some places, the provincial government shoulders the entire LGU share. In most places, however, the
provincial government splits it with the city or municipal government. The exact sharing between the
provincial government and the city/municipal government varies, depending on the agreed terms. There
are also some cities, municipalities, and barangays that fully sponsor their own poor residents.
5 The eligible HCFP beneficiaries exclude children who are under six years old. These children are
provided health care services under a separate law.CAPUNO 225
ment patterns. In the Philippines, only two provinces—Abra and Camiguin—par-
ticipated in the NHIP-SP program in 1997 (Table 6). Together, they accounted for all
the 2,094 enrolled indigent families, which represented  less than one percent of the
target beneficiaries in that year. By 2000, 140 LGUs participated and accounted for
95 percent of the total number of enrolled families. The remaining five percent—
17,993 indigent families in all—was  enrolled under Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap of
the Estrada administration. Still, however, less than 10 percent of the poor families
at that time were insured. Thus, realizing the financial difficulties of the LGUs, the
national government began providing full subsidy to more indigent families. Under
the Plan 5M, the national government enrolled about 68 percent of the 6.285 million
indigent families covered in 2004 when the universal coverage of the poor was
purportedly achieved.6 This target was achieved with only 78 percent of the LGUs
(1,328) participating in the NHIP-SP, which enrolled only about 1.5 million poor
families. The rest of the enrolled indigent families were subsidized by other donors.
Compared to the NHIP, the HCFP was able to cover a significantly greater
number of target beneficiaries during its first three years of operation. Actual
HCFP beneficiaries totaled 7.8 million in 2003, 13.2 million in 2004, and 12.4 mil-
lion in 2005 (Table 7). However, still less than 100 percent of the poor were
covered under the program. In 2003, only about 9.5 percent of the population
was insured under the HCFP when in fact about 28 percent of them were consid-
Table 6. Number of enrolled families and beneficiaries and participating LGUs under the
Philippines’ NHIP-Sponsored Program, 1977–2004
Enrolled Families
Year Number As % of poor Beneficiaries Participating LGUs
families
1997 2,094 0.05 14,520 2
1998 47,290 236,450 14
1999 86,827 434,135 26
2000 347,016 8.36 1,735,080 140
2001 619,014 3,095,070 326
2002 1,260,864 6,304,320 891
2003 1,762,116 43.81 8,810,580 1,302
2004 6,285,150 31,290,750 1,328
Note: Participating LGUs refer to provinces, cities, municipalities, or barangays that paid either the entire
or the partial premium contributions of their indigents enrolled under the NHIP-Sponsored Program.
Source: PhilHealth.
6 There is no official estimate of poverty incidence in 2004. The incidence of poor families in 2003 was






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































ered poor.7 Even in 2004 when the number of enrolled poor population nearly
doubled, the coverage rate of about 16 percent was still less than the poverty
rate of nearly 23.2 percent. This may seem surprising considering that the pro-
vincial governments in Vietnam do not face the same financial obligations as
those in the Philippines. There are two reasons for this.
First, the income thresholds used in the HCFP program are lower than those
set by the General Statistics Office (Table 7). Estimated by the Ministry of Labor,
Invalid and Social Affairs, these income thresholds are also used in other entitle-
ment programs for the poor. To meet these obligations, the Government of Vietnam
understandably limits the coverage of these programs to the poorest of the poor.
Second, the administrative capacity of the local implementers in identifying the
target beneficiaries is weak. The procedures followed in drawing up, revising,
finalizing, and approving the list of beneficiaries is tortuous, open to leakage and
fraught with delay, and involve local political leaders and labor officials from the
commune, to the district, and up to the provincial level (Capuno et al. 2006). Ethnic
minorities were also excluded in some provinces like Cao Bang, which misinter-
preted the title of Decision 139/2002/QD-TTg (On Medical Check-up and Treat-
ment for Poor People) as a an exclusive program for the poor. These reasons
explain why in 2004, when provinces presumably have already adjusted to the new
program, enrollments rates in the regions of North Central Coast, South Central
Coast, and Mekong River Delta were still significantly lower than their corre-
sponding poverty rates.
Horizontal equity and sustainability
The NHIP-SP and HCFP are both tax-financed programs but differ in approaches in
eliciting LGU participation. The national government premium subsidy under the
NHIP-SP and HCFP programs may be considered as matching grant and block
grant, respectively, and are both conditional on the enrollment of the eligible
beneficiaries. Both transfer schemes help explain the patterns and equitableness
of enrolment and the financial sustainability of the programs.
Though perhaps initially generous, the matching grant approach under
the NHIP-SP may have not been very effective in encouraging and sustaining
the participation of the low-income LGUs. Some of these LGUs are observed to
discontinue the enrollment of their poor constituents after some years even
before their share in the premium payments reaches the maximum 50 percent.
Moreover, because many LGUs are unable to raise the full amount to enroll all
eligible beneficiaries, they resort to additional and nontransparent criteria to
7 Although the HCFP specifically targets the ethnic minorities and residents of poor communities, most
members of these population groups are also poor.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 228
prune down the list of beneficiaries. When this happens, LGUs often commit
errors in excluding those who are more deserving and including those who are
less deserving. It is often noticed, for example, that “political indigents”—i.e.,
actual beneficiaries who are close to the local officials but otherwise ineligible—
make it to the list. Hence, the effective co-financing shares between the LGUs
and the national government could explain the patterns of new, renewed, and
discontinued enrolments across LGUs. With the resulting unevenness in the
coverage of the poor, they are in effect “un-equally treated” under the program
despite their similarities in economic conditions.  According to the fiscal decen-
tralization literature, such horizontal inequity can  be expected when the financ-
ing of a redistributive program—like the NHIP-SP—is delegated to the LGUs.
While the problem of horizontal inequity is partly solved when the national
government singularly sponsored the bulk of enrolled families since 2004, the
change in the financing mode also raises the concern about sustainability, given
the government’s other competing expenditure priorities.
Horizontal inequity is less of a problem in Vietnam because the national
government guarantees the minimum premium subsidy for the poor.8 However, as
the LGUs are dependent on the block grant, they have less incentive to mobilize
additional resources or improve their administrative capacity to ensure proper
coverage. The national government therefore shoulders the burden of ensuring
the financial sustainability of the HCFP. Despite this, however, regional variations
in enrollment rates are noted, which indicates that the poor are also unequally
treated in Vietnam.
RISK POOLING
Another important design feature of SHI programs is risk pooling. If the pool of
members is large, the financial risks due to adverse selection is spread among
the members and therefore minimized. The concern with SHI for the poor pro-
grams is that the target population as a whole has the highest health risk yet it
has the lowest ability to pay compared to other population groups. To reduce
financial risks, a minimum amount of revenues from premium contributions should
be attained, possibly through public subsidies financed through general taxes,
as in the case of the NHIP-SP and HCFP.  To ensure further its financial
sustainability, the SHI for the poor program must be integrated with another
program with a different or, ideally, a national risk pool.  Once integrated with the
wider risk pool, the program can possibly expand its benefits to members through
8 In 2003, some provinces failed to cover all eligible HCFP beneficiaries because either there were delays
in the release of the state budget or the provincial estimates of the HCFP beneficiaries were different from
those of the national government's.CAPUNO 229
the subsidy coming from the high-income, low-risk groups. In this aspect, the
NHIP-SP and HCFP differs.
From its inception, the NHIP-SP is already part of a nationwide risk pool, in
contrast to the previous Medicare Program that was concentrated on the em-
ployed population in the formal and informal sectors. In addition to the indigent
and employed population groups9, the PhilHealth now targets and provides life-
time coverage to retirees and pensioners. As of June 2004, the members under the
Sponsored Program accounted for about 47.8 percent of the total membership.
What is perhaps more impressive is that high indigent coverage is achieved in all
regions in the country (Table 8). As mentioned above, these enrolment trends were
mainly the consequence of the national government’s Plan 5M, which essentially
“absolved” the LGUs from their financial obligations and temporarily transferred
this obligation to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office. Without the Plan 5M,
the risk pool of the NHIP-SP would have been more limited, considering that many
LGU still failed to sponsor most of their poor constituents.
Even with a highly variable enrolment of the poor across regions, the
PhilHealth itself is in a position to attenuate the resulting risks. By law, it is tasked
to administer the National Health Insurance Fund (NHIF), which includes contri-
butions from program members, balances from the Medicare Program, special gov-
ernment appropriations, donations and grants-in-aid, and accruals. Currently, the
NHIF comprises the benefit fund and the reserve fund. The PhilHealth draws from
the benefit fund to finance all benefit packages provided to different members.10
The PhilHealth keeps under the reserve fund all unexpended revenues in the
current year.  Thus, cross-subsidization among pools of members is implicit in the
structure of the NHIF.
In contrast, the HCFP, as originally conceived, does not have the same
flexibility. The provincial FMBs are each tasked to manage all HCFP funds and
to provide coverage to all target beneficiaries within their respective jurisdic-
tions, independent of other provinces and other health insurance programs.
Thus, risk pooling across regions or population groups at the program level
was not possible.
Also, the FMBs were not allowed to keep reserves. All unexpended fund
balances for the current year becomes part of the beginning balance in the follow-
9 The employed population groups include employees in the government and the private sector, the self-
employed, overseas Filipino workers, and professionals in private practice such as doctors, lawyers,
and dentists.
10 According to Republic Act 7875, contributions of members from the government and the private sector
shall not exceed three percent of their monthly salaries; contributions of self-employed members shall not
exceed three percent of their estimated actual net income for the preceding year; and contributions made
in behalf of indigent members shall not exceed the minimum contributions set for employed members.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 230
ing year. Thus, provinces with positive beginning balances receive less state
budget for the program than what is due them had they used up all previous
appropriations.  However, the actual budget transfers apparently were less than
the required amounts in some regions, especially in the early years of HCFP imple-
mentation. This led some regions to provide inadequate premium subsidies to
their poor constituents. In 2003, for example, the average budget provided in each
of the seven regions in Vietnam was less than the minimum mandated amount of
VND52,500 per person per year (Table 9). One reason for the budget shortfalls is
the discrepancy in the estimated number of target population used by the Ministry
of Finance that provided the state budget for HCFP and the identified beneficiaries
constructed by the FMBs. The problem of budget shortfall, except possibly in the
Northern Uplands, was already solved in 2004 when the nationwide average pre-
mium subsidy per person was increased to VND54,519 from VND39,669 in 2003.
Table 8. Shares in the total number of poor families and total enrollment under the SP
program, by region: 1997, 2000, and 2003
1997 2000 2003
Regions Poor Indigent Poor Indigent Poor Indigent
families members families members families members
Philippines 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
National Capital Region 2.83 0 3.08 7.40 2.76 3.82
CAR 2.44 75.69 2.04 4.44 1.79 3.31
Ilocos 6.52 0 5.74 7.69 5.32 6.71
Cagayan Valley 4.17 0 3.46 4.49 2.82 5.03
Central Luzon 4.90 0 6.48 18.39 6.04 9.97
Southern Luzon 11.04
Southern Luzon A n.a. 0 6.57 5.36 7.88 5.66
Southern Luzon B n.a. 0 3.92 4.81 4.96 7.16
Bicol 10.76 0 9.82 5.14 9.54 7.20
Western Visayas 11.05 0 10.71 13.60 9.87 7.64
Central Visayas 7.98 0 8.40 1.29 7.12 4.25
Eastern Visayas 6.80 0 6.68 5.82 6.61 4.23
Western Mindanao 4.95 0 5.06 3.16 6.43 5.10
Northern Mindanao 8.57 24.31 6.31 2.70 6.92 18.52
Southern Mindanao 8.48 0 4.87 7.10 5.74 4.51
Central Mindanao 4.98 0 6.37 0.89 6.57 3.17
CARAGA n.a 0 4.32 7.71 4.86 3.61
ARMM 4.53 n.a. 6.17 n.a. 5.69 n.a.
Sources: Philippine Statistical Yearbook 2001, 2005, PHIC.
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Table 9. State budget for the Health Care Fund for the Poor, total and per target benefi-
ciary by region: 2003-04
Total budget (In million VND) Budget per target beneficiary
Regions (VND)
2003 2004 2005 2003 2004 2005
Vietnam 520,614.30 717,684.50 728,902.30 39,669 54,519 58,589
Northern Uplands 125,171.10 195,202.50 257,303.00 26,387 42,444 57,357
Red River Delta 43,189.20 48,653.60 36,695.10 43,377 60,893 67,954
North Central Coast 79,900.00 115,241.40 95,139.60 35,796 58,439 52,217
South Central Coast 40,645.40 53,096.00 75,511.10 46,960 56,606 80,424
Central Highlands 73,419.20 97,630.10 82,276.80 38,524 54,941 63,387
South East 44,178.10 58,324.60 59,668.10 42,483 52,974 49,740
Mekong River Delta 114,111.40 149,536.20 122,308.50 44,152 75,676 56,729
Note: The total number of beneficiaries in 2005 does not include the provinces with no data: Hai Duong,
Tuyen Quang, Ha Tinh, Gia Lai, Long An, and Ca Mau.
Source: Ministry of Health, Vietnam.
However, there was a large variation in the average premium subsidy in 2004. The
average state budget in the two poorest areas, Northern Uplands and Central
Highlands, were VND42,444 and VND54,941, respectively. In the same year, the
average state budget in the South East Region was still below the mandated
minimum although this was reached already in all the other regions. This new
problem was due to weak monitoring of HCFP fund balances, which led to greater
budget transfers to provinces than was warranted.
The HCFP problems concerning limited risk pool and fragmented funds are
now addressed under Decree 63/2005/ND-CP (Promulgating the Medical Insur-
ance Regulation). The new decree mandates the creation of a unified health insur-
ance fund comprising the premium contributions of all members, state contribu-
tions, donations from private and donor agencies, and other revenues, to be ad-
ministered by the VSS. Compared to the FMBs, the VSS is in a better position to
spread risks among a larger pool of members. According to Tran (2005), the VSS
had about 14.39 million members under the compulsory and voluntary schemes in
2004, up by 50 percent from 2000. The VSS also provided an increasing number of
health insurance cards to the HCFP beneficiaries, from 0.84 million in 2000 to 3.89
million in 2004. While the HCFP beneficiaries technically were not VSS members
prior to Decree 63/2005/ND-CP, they represent the incremental pool of members,
which points to additional financial risks and organizational demands that VSS will
face under the new decree.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 232
PURCHASING
The final point of comparison between the two SHI programs for the poor is the
optimality in the use of resources. These resources are expected to be spent on the
provision of benefits and the administration or operation of the program. The
program can control moral hazard on the patient side by specifying the benefit
package and can minimize fraud on the provider side through payment mecha-
nisms. However, excessive control over the payment of claims could reduce the
effective benefits to the members and build up reserves, which may encourage
unnecessary operational expenses or inoptimal investments. Thus, safeguards for
attaining administrative efficiency must be put in place as well.
By law, the PhilHealth is allowed to keep reserves equivalent to two years’
worth of projected benefit payments. Its administrative expenses also cannot ex-
ceed 12 percent of total contributions and not more than three percent of invest-
ment earnings from the immediately preceding year. In contrast, the FMBs in
Vietnam are not allowed to keep reserves, and the provincial governments are
expected to support the administrative costs of the HCFP program. Both pro-
grams, however, keep large unexpended fund balances. It is estimated that the
PhilHealth’s reserves are equivalent to about 4.08 years in 2004 (Jowett and Hsiao
2005). In Vietnam, the unexpended HCFP funds are high even in the poorest re-
gions where presumably there is high latent need for financial support among the
target beneficiaries. These findings suggest that actual benefits to members may
be less than what each program can support.
Benefit packages and expenditures
Beginning in 1999, all members of the NHIP, including the poor, enjoy a uniform set
of benefit entitlements. Presently, the inpatient hospital care benefits include room
and board charges, professional fees, diagnostic, laboratory and other medical
examination charges, fees for the use of surgical or medical equipment and facili-
ties, and prescription drugs. The same range of benefits, except for room and
board, is included in the list of outpatient care services provided to NHIP-SP
members under the capitation program.  The benefit exclusions are expenses on
the fifth and subsequent normal obstetrical deliveries, nonprescription drugs and
devices, treatment for alcohol abuse or dependency, cosmetic surgery, optometric
services, and cost-ineffective procedures as defined by PhilHealth. Like all other
NHIP members, the indigent members have protection against catastrophic health
expenditures. However, because of benefit ceilings, they effectively co-pay for
these large unexpected health expenditures.
There is a ceiling on insurance payments for the included services al-
though the support ceilings for some of them have been increased and addi-
tional benefit packages were introduced through the years. For example, theCAPUNO 233
benefit ceilings for drugs and for x-ray and laboratory services were raised to 34
percent and 45 percent, respectively, since January 1, 2002. In 2003, PhilHealth
launched four new benefit packages: TB-DOTS, maternity, SARS, and dialysis
treatments.  Additional benefit packages were later introduced in 2006: outpa-
tient malaria, outpatient HIV, newborn care, and third-normal spontaneous deliv-
ery.  In consideration of the special circumstances of the indigent members,
outpatient benefit package (OPB) was initiated in 2000 in four LGUs that received
their insurance payments on capitation basis. Through a local ordinance, these
LGUs opened trust funds, called capitation funds, to secure the insurance pay-
ments for OPB services. Since 2003, the so-called capitation program was adopted
in more LGUs.  Under this initiative, indigent members can avail of outpatient
services from their accredited rural health units (RHUs), which PhilHealth pays
on a capitation basis.
There are indications that the indigent members enjoy the expanded benefit
packages and higher support ceilings. For instance, PhilHealth’s benefit payments
for SP members have risen from PhP1.2 million in 1999 to PhP614.4 million in 2003,
or from less than 2 percent of total program benefit payments in 1999 to nearly
10 percent in 2004 (Table 10). In 2003, the total amount of claims under the NHIP-SP
was 23 percent more than the PhP561 million collected for this particular program
(Obermann et al. 2006), suggesting actual cross-subsidy from other component
programs.  It seems, however, that more benefits can be extended to the NHIP-SP
members. In 2003, the NHIP-SP members had the lowest total number of claims
(174,000) and average value per claim (PhP4,008) compared to the member groups
(Obermann et al. 2006). Schneider and Racelis (2004) also found in a sample of 46
RHUs in four provinces that insurance coverage had a weak effect in encouraging
greater use of RHU services. They also found, however, that the utilization of
Table 10. PhilHealth’s total benefit payments: 1998–2004
Year All programs Sponsored program
(in million pesos) Amount As % of total for
(in million pesos) all programs
1998 66 1.2 1.82
1999 2,999 5.8 0.19
2000 6,764 35 0.52
2001 7,740 135.9 1.76
2002 8,839 347.8 3.93
2003 10,961 864.4 7.89
2004 6,191 614.4 9.92
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these services by the NHIP-SP members was relatively greater in areas with high
NHIP-SP enrolment rates.
In Vietnam, HCFP members are entitled to the same benefit packages as
the members of the compulsory health insurance schemes. The benefit pack-
ages include both inpatient hospital services and outpatient care services.
Unlike the members of the compulsory health insurance scheme, however,
HCFP beneficiaries are entitled to 100-percent support ceiling. In some prov-
inces, the HCFP beneficiaries are also given transportation and food allow-
ances whenever they are referred to higher level hospitals. Because of these
generous benefit packages and the fact that FMBs have weak incentives to
save on the HCFP funds, it is surprising to find regions having budget sur-
pluses through the years.  For example, the Northern Uplands  and the Mekong
River Delta—both relatively poor regions—consistently spent less than 70
percent of their annual HCFP budgets from 2003 to 2005 (Table 11). At the
national level, only 58.32 percent in 2003, 66.04 percent in 2004, and 74.97
percent in 2005 of the total HCFP funds were used.
There are three reasons for the budget surpluses. First, the time spent in
preparing the list of beneficiaries was lengthy resulting in delays in the issuance
of the health insurance or health care cards. In 2006, the lag was three to four
months in some provinces. Without these cards, the beneficiaries cannot claim
insurance benefits.
Table 11. Benefit expenditures under the HCFP, by region: 2003–2004
2003 2004 2005
Regions Total As % of Total As % of Total As % of
expenditures total budget expenditures total budget expenditures total budget
(in million (in million (in million
VND) VND) VND)
Vietnam 303,621 58.32 473,988.00 66.04 547,393.30 74.97
Northern Uplands 67,098 53.61 127,128.30 65.13 171,418.50 66.62
Red River Delta 24,192 56.01 36,159.60 74.32 31,323.80 85.36
North Central Coast 34,988 43.79 75,034.10 65.11 108,638.10 114.19
South Central Coast 24,617 60.56 31,265.30 58.88 45,407.80 60.13
Central Highlands 52,785 71.90 70,875.80 72.6 61,108.80 74.27
South East 38,042 86.11 50,618.90 86.79 45,915.40 76.95
Mekong River Delta 61,900 54.25 82,906.10 55.44 82,638.00 67.57
Note: Total expenditures include purchases of health insurance cards, direct reimbursements, printing
and distribution costs, and other operational expenses.
Sources: Mediconsult (2004) and Ministry of Health, Vietnam.CAPUNO 235
Second, many provinces chose to provide insurance coverage through the
direct reimbursement scheme rather than through the health insurance card scheme.
In 2004, only about 30 percent of the total number of HCFP beneficiaries were
enrolled under the health insurance card scheme. This rate dropped to about 25
percent in 2005. Under the direct reimbursement scheme, the health facility bills the
FMB for the services provided to an HCFP beneficiary (who pays nothing). The
provincial government pays the health facility directly although the release of the
payment is often slow. In some provinces, facilities are provided quarterly allot-
ments from the HCFP funds. These funds have to be liquidated before subsequent
allocations can be provided. Some hospitals complain that the amount transferred
are only for drugs and sometimes inadequate. In contrast, under the health insur-
ance card scheme, the FMB pays the local VSS office the face value (VND50,000)
of each card issued to the beneficiaries. Under this setup, the VSS pays the insur-
ance claims directly to the health facilities. While both the provincial government
and the VSS are not allowed to keep reserves, the VSS has less flexibility to use the
funds for other purposes11 or to pool them with other insurance programs to
spread risk. It also cannot claim more than VND2,500 per beneficiary per year for
administration expenses. In some provinces, however, the VSS is also slow to
disburse the funds because it accredits only district hospitals and higher-level
facilities, and thus deprives lower-level facilities of possible insurance reimburse-
ments.
Third, many of the beneficiaries were still not fully aware of their rights and
entitlements, the high indirect costs of treatment, and the low quality of health
facilities most accessible to them. Many of the HCFP beneficiaries that belong to
ethnic minorities have special needs and sensibilities that are not always ad-
dressed by the program. Although some HCFP beneficiaries can avail of supple-
mental transportation benefits, the budget for these expenses is limited and the
practice is not observed in all provinces. Without the additional support, access to
health facilities may be difficult, especially in the Northern Uplands  region where
the overall terrain is rugged and mountainous (Capuno et al. 2006).
Provider payments
Both the NHIP-SP and HCFP programs employ a capped fee-for-service
payment scheme to encourage the provision of service to insured patients and to
discourage overprovision. The actual effect of this payment system on provider
performance in the two countries has yet to be fully investigated. However, there
11 It is possible, for example, that the HCFP funds were used in some provinces to buy drugs that were
normally financed by the regular provincial health budgets. These drugs are distributed to health facilities
for dispensing to target beneficiaries.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 236
is an institutional reason why this payment scheme has weaker incentive effect
among public physicians than among private physicians. The reason is that public
doctors are paid fixed monthly salaries and their individual shares in the revenues
from insurance payments are not tightly linked to their respective performances.
This is because the LGUs that own and operate these hospitals often control the
distribution of the insurance payments to hospital staff.
In the Philippines, the distribution of insurance payments to public hospi-
tals for professional services has been a contentious issue among LGU person-
nel. Based on Department of Health guidelines, insurance payments  for profes-
sional fees are to be transmitted directly to the hospital chiefs. The revenues are
to be divided evenly between the doctors, on the one hand, and the hospital
staff, on the other. What happens in most places is that the insurance payments
are received and recorded in a trust fund of the local treasury and can only be
released to the doctors and staff with the requisite appropriations and approval
of the local chief executive and budget officials. The distribution is done semi-
annually. Often, the doctors and hospital staff have no idea how much  is actu-
ally due them.
Partly to solve this problem, PhilHealth now specifies in its standard
agreement with LGUs participating under the capitation fund program that 20
percent of the funds will be used for administrative costs, i.e., as supplemental
allowance to rural health unit (RHU) doctors and other staff. While this se-
cured the direct payment to health professionals for outpatient services ren-
dered to NHIP-SP members in the locality, it also provoked further resentment
from nonhealth personnel who think that the health staff are unduly favored.
In some places, part of the 20 percent is shared with other nonhealth staff (e.g.,
budget officer).
In Vietnam, doctors and other members of the medical staff get a fixed
share of the user fee revenues starting in 1989 when user fees were adopted in
the public health system after the issuance of Decree 45/HDBT. From 35 percent
of the user fee revenues, their share was reduced to 15 percent in 1994 and later
restored to 30 percent in 1995. These additional incentives, however, were not
tied directly to the overall quality of staff’s services, especially those provided to
the poor, the disabled, orphans, homeless elderly people, those living in high
mountainous areas, and other groups exempted from user fees (Knowles et al.
2003). These exemptions were later removed in 2002 under Decision 139/QD-
TTg, which still protected the poor from user fees but through insurance.
Whether doctor’s performance has improved, either in quantity or in quality,
with the adoption of the HCFP is not clear from available data. What seems clear is
that hospital revenues from insurance payments may have increased. In 2004,
provincial hospitals received 39 percent of the total HCFP reimbursements, whileCAPUNO 237
commune health stations and district hospitals (including polyclinics) got about
21.4 percent and 34 percent, respectively.  Under Decree 10/2002/ND-CP, doctors
should get a share of the revenues from user fees (which include insurance pay-
ments).  It appears, however, that the doctors in many district hospitals and lower-
level facilities did not get much of the revenues from insurance payments since the
HCFP advances to these health facilities were mostly drugs and medical supplies
(Capuno et al. 2006).
Administrative efficiency
The ability of the PhilHealth and the FMBs to deal with a decentralized public
health system determines the overall administrative efficiency of the NHIP-SP and
HCFP.  The PhilHealth maintains 12 regional offices that take care of enrollment
and claims verification. The head office performs quality control and payment
functions. This setup has led to a growth in enrollment but resulted in delays in
insurance payment and accreditation, and inconsistent quality assurance. While
the PhilHealth promises to reimburse all approved claims within 30 days, the actual
number of days spent from filing to payment varies. In 2005, for example, the Taft
District Hospital waited nearly 53 days and the Pintuyan Community Hospital 49
days before all their claims were settled. Delays were due to incomplete supporting
documents submitted by the hospitals and the lack of authority of local provincial
PhilHealth officials to act on the deficient claims at once without the need for
sending them first to the regional office (Capuno 2005). Another source of com-
plaint is the delay in the accreditation of LGU hospitals and RHUs. With the
accreditation, many LGUs see the claims reimbursements as a way of “recouping
their investments” in indigent enrollments.12 Accreditation does not, however,
ensure that all services actually provided consistently pass the minimum quality
standards, especially in devolved health facilities. After all, the PhilHealth has to
exercise greater caution in revoking the accreditation of these facilities. Otherwise,
it may unduly provoke the concerned LGUs to withdraw its participation in the
NHIP-SP. It is the dual role of the LGUs as financier and service provider that
renders difficulty to PhilHealth in performing its regulatory function.
In contrast, the HCFP is administered in a highly decentralized manner. In
principle, the FMBs can act faster and more decisively on issues concerning
enrollment, payments, quality standards, and grievances and complaints. How-
ever, the structures and procedures for acting on these issues are not as well
defined in Vietnam as in the Philippines. Beneficiaries are more inclined to vent
12 In the first year of participation in the NHIP-SP and capitation fund program, a sixth class LGU will pay
premium of up to PhP120 per indigent member and get in return P300 per indigent beneficiary in capitation
payments, or a " financial gain" of PhP180 per indigent enrollee.PHILIPPINE JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT 2006 238
their insurance complaints to commune leaders and other political officials rather
than directly to service providers. Moreover, the service providers are represented
in the FMBs, which pose a possible conflict of interest.
The FMBs are also very powerful. They discharge the financing, enrollment,
service provision, and quality control functions. But while the FMBs can settle
HCFP issues with finality, they are not subject to a system of checks and balances
that could help improve their decisions. Even the Ministry of Health (MOH),
which monitors all FMBs, cannot maintain local presence at all times. Officials from
the central office of the MOH visit provinces irregularly and usually just require
the FMBs to submit their annual HCFP reports.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Both the Philippines and Vietnam accomplished a lot in terms of extending insur-
ance coverage to their poor population under their respective SHI programs. Their
experiences can provide important policy insights to other developing countries.
Their experiences have also brought into focus the importance of reviewing the
traditional design features of SHI programs, particularly their relevance when ex-
ecuted in a decentralized public health setting.
Similar only in their target beneficiaries, the two programs are distinct in
other key design features. As new policies are implemented, however, the HCFP of
Vietnam will resemble more of the features of the NHIP-SP of the Philippines. In
particular, the new regulatory policy in medical insurance will unify under the VSS
all social health insurance programs in Vietnam, similar to the NHIP-SP under
PhilHealth. Private providers will also now be able to participate in the HCFP. In
these aspects, the HCFP can learn from the experiences of the more mature NHIP-
SP. The integration of the HCFP with other SHI programs in Vietnam will enlarge
the risk pool, from which the HCFP beneficiaries can potentially benefit from,
similar to the experience of the enrolled indigents under the NHIP-SP. To realize
these benefits, greater health service utilization must be encouraged through in-
formation and education campaign. However, in both countries, it is perhaps the
improvement in the quality of local health facilities that will have a greater impact
on utilization. Without upgrading the quality, the VSS will just suck up the HCFP
funds from the poor regions (which are unable to meet accreditation requirements)
and transfer them to richer regions (where quality is better and utilization is greater).
This predicted cross-subsidization is clearly regressive but making sure it
will not happen is difficult and also potentially inefficient. Cross-subsidization is
unwarranted when certain members are systematically restrained from their insur-
ance entitlements, say, due to inadequate or substandard services. With the recent
amendments in the HCFP, the purchasing and quality control functions are trans-
ferred from the FMBs to the VSS. Like the PhilHealth, the VSS will have greaterCAPUNO 239
incentives and bargaining power to impose quality standards on participating
providers.
In both countries, however, the default choice of service provider of the
indigent at the local level is the public health sector. In this sector, the doctors and
other health staff are paid fixed monthly salaries and their performances are only
indirectly linked to the insurance payments. Even when the medical staff are en-
titled to these payments, their individual shares are not necessarily based on
performance but rather on equity or status. It is common for hospital chiefs in the
Philippines to receive higher pay than other physicians who may have attended
more patients. Moreover, these additional payments to the health staff become a
source of envy and enmity for other LGU personnel. Thus, the traditional SHI
approaches to provider payment do not have their expected effects on the perfor-
mance of public sector physicians and staff. This is an issue that requires further
investigation.
In addition to these personnel incentive issues, the PhilHealth and the VSS
likewise have to contend with the LGUs that finance or facilitate the enrollment of
the poor into the program and provide the services to these enrollees. With this
dual role, the LGU can try to bargain for a lower standard of care in exchange for
enrollment. This situation is not traditionally investigated on in the insurance
literature, as the financing agent (usually the enrollee) is assumed to be different
from the service provider. While these functions are separate in the private sector,
they are often discharged jointly under a decentralized public health setting. The
case of the Philippines and Vietnam show that this is also an important policy
research issue.
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